

The Political Settlement of Local Economic Development in Ghana's Local Governance System

AKPEKO AGBEVADE (Ph.D.)

University of Cape Coast, College of Distance Education & Entrepreneurship Training Institute.

ABSTRACT : Both the 1992 Republican Constitution and the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) have conferred political, administrative, social, economic and developmental authorities and functions on the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. However, the assemblies have exercised all other authorities to the neglect of their economic and developmental functions. In view of this, they still rely on central government for development hence the concept local economic development emerged for assemblies to use their local resources to champion the development of their localities. Deploying both primary and secondary sources of data, this paper examined the extent of political settlement in the implementation of local economic development (LED) in Ghana. The study found that the nature of the LED programme, the strategic nature of the MMDAs, the activism of the actors, the benefits to be derived by the actors, the political party in power and the need to test new development paradigms shaped the behaviour of actors in the LED implementation process. The desire of each actor to project its interest above the others culminated into "turf war" among them in the implementation process. The study recommends that the development of localities should supersede the interest of actors, locality leadership should be proactive and aggressive in wooing investors, and incentives should be provided for investors who invest in the hinterlands. Key lessons learnt were: leadership was significant in LED, collaboration among actors is important for the success of LED.

Keywords: actors, implementation, local economic development, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies, political settlement.

1. INTRODUCTION

Following the implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme in 1983, which culminated into the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1987, Ghana adopted decentralisation as a means of deepening grass root participation in the governance and development process. On return to constitutional rule in 1993, the 1992 Republican Constitution and the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936) both recognized the importance of decentralization in attaining local development and as such provided legal, fiscal, administrative, social, developmental and economic powers and authorities to local government units (LGUs) to be able to perform their local governance development functions (Republic of Ghana, 1992, 2016).

The LGUs instead of focusing on the economic functions rather concentrated on the performance of the political, administrative and social functions and always looking up to the central government for the needed local development (UNDP and Republic of Ghana, 2011). This dependence brought about inequality in grassroots development and mismatch in the development needs and projects of the various LGUs. To ensure that (economic) development projects and programmes meet the needs of localities, experts mooted the concept of local economic development (LED). According to the Ghana Decentralisation Policy (2011-2015),

LED is defined as “the process by which local governments, local businesses and other actors join forces and resources to enter into a new partnership agreements with each other or other stakeholders to create new jobs and stimulate economic activity in municipalities, towns and villages”. The paper extends this definition by adding that LED utilizes the available resources of a locality and the end result of LED is to create employment opportunities, income generation and infrastructure provision aimed at improving the quality of life of residents with the ultimate goal of reducing poverty.

One characteristic that stands tall from the definition is that LED is a participatory process. The Operational Manual of LED in Ghana (Republic of Ghana, 2014:7-10) for instance identified the following as the actors: Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Council on Decentralization, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), Advisory Council, LED Secretariat based at the MLGRD, National Development Planning Commission, Parliament, Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), the various Regional Coordinating Councils, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), the private sector, National Association of Local Authorities of Ghana (NALAG), civil society organisations, the local communities and financial institutions. These multiple actors are sometimes involved in competing interests and conflicts at times in the LED process.

There is a gradual emergence of studies on LED in Ghana. These studies have focused on financing LED (Agbevade, 2018a), the strategies and challenges (Agbevade, 2018b; Oduro-Ofori, 2016; Mensah et. al., 2013a; Ofei-Aboagye, 2009), the actors (Akudugu and Laube, 2013), policy and institutional frameworks (Mensah et.al. 2017, 2013b, Oduro-Ofori, 2016), the nexus between LED, value chain and poverty reduction (Agbevade, 2018d). From this array of studies, it is abundantly clear that there is the absence of study on the factors that shape the political behaviour of the actors in the LED process. This study therefore fills this literature lacuna by employing the concept of political settlement to explain the behaviour of actors in the LED process.

The paper is structured into five sections. Section two looks at the state of affairs on LED in Ghana and briefly discusses the concept of political settlement and its deployment in the study. Section three is devoted to the methodology employed, section four discusses the actors in the LED process and the factors that shapes their behaviour in the LED implementation process and section five deals with the conclusion and offers some recommendations for reflection for improved actor relationship in the implementation of LED.

Local Economic Development in Ghana- The State of Affairs

Studies on LED in Ghana is an evolving one. The studies have focused on the factors that influenced the adoption of LED, the policy perspectives, actors and institutional frameworks, strategies, financing, and the challenges (Agbevade, 2018a,b,d, Mensah et. al. 2013a, Mensah et.al. 2013b, Mensah et. al. 2017, Oduro-Ofori, 2016, Akudugu, 2013, Akudugu and Laube, 2013, Ofei-Aboagye, 2009).

Agbevade (2018a) hints of the fact that different historical contexts and diverse situations such as unemployment, poverty and infrastructure deficit as well as national government policies were some factors that influenced the implementation of LED in Ghana’s MMDAs.

On the policy perspectives, Mensah et. al. (2017) discussed the policy trajectory of LED implementation in Ghana from the pre-independence era to date and described the period preceding 1987 as the “lost decades of LED implementation” because development plans were mostly top-down with little or no input from the grassroots and these development plans were sectoral rather than territorial. The period from 1988 where Ghana started implementing decentralization, the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, the passage of various Acts of Parliament and national development frameworks that promoted the role of MMDAs in local development and preparation of the National LED policy and its operational Manual by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) as the period of “policy maturity”. Mensah et. al. (2013a) similarly identified the 1992 Constitution, District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), Ghana Vision 2020, Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1), and Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 2) as some legislative policies and frameworks of LED. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), MMDAs, MLGRD,

Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Services (GRATIS) projects, rural banks and traditional authorities were the institutional frameworks for LED implementation in Ghana (Mensah et.al. 2013b). Oduro-Ofori (2016) indicated that though these frameworks supported MMDAs in the promotion of LED, they failed to specifically stipulate what the MMDAs were supposed to do and how. In addition, the frameworks also failed to provide sanctions to MMDAs, which did not actively get involved in LED.

With respect to the actors, Oduro-Ofori (2016) identified local government units (LGUs) and institutions such as the Business Advisory Centre (B.A.C.), Agriculture Development Unit, the Office for National Culture, Departments of Town and Country Planning, Cooperatives, Works and Community Department as well as Sub-Committees such as Development Planning, Culture, Tourism and Agriculture as directly involved in LED promotion at the various LGUs. In spite of these arrays of institutions, LED could not be effectively implemented due to lack of institutional coordination between the local government institutions (Mensah et.al. 2013; Oduro-Ofori, 2016).

On the LED strategies and initiatives, Ofey-Aboagye (2009), Mensah et. al. (2013b), Oduro-Ofori (2016), identified micro-credit provision, agro-processing, structural development, health and educational activities, upgrading the skills of artisans, human resource development and infrastructure provision as LED interventions. Agbevade (2018b) stepped up the discussion on the LED strategies by espousing that the LED strategies implemented by MMDAs in Ghana can be grouped into contemporary and traditional LED approaches. LED implementation in Ghana has not made the expected impact because of the focus on hardware LED to the neglect of software LED which dealt with capacity development, provision of financial assistance and other intangible inputs (Oduro-Ofori, 2016).

On LED financing, three main categories have been identified, namely; inter-governmental transfers, donor or private sector funding and internally generated funds. The ability of an MMDA to attract funds was largely determined by factors such as the strategic nature and category of the MMDA, the caliber of MMDA leadership, political and personal commitment of some top level staff to LED implementation, the available economic development incentives and the immediate returns that investors expects to gain from their investments (Agbevade, 2018a).

On the typology of LED programmes, scholars had varied views. Whiles Mensah et. al. (2017) identified five variations of LED in Ghana; namely, central-government led LED, local-government championed LED, local organizations and local NGO-spearheaded LED, international organization-initiated LED and individual –led LED, Akudugu and Laube (2013) on their part enumerated traditional LED and contemporary LED as the variations.

With respect to the role of international organizations in LED implementation in Ghana, Akudugu and Laube (2013) and Mensah et. al. (2017) identified the ILO, GIZ and UNDP as actors. Whereas Akudugu and Laube (2013) saw the actors as drivers of LED in Ghana, Mensah et.al. (2017) opined that these international organizations have reinvigorated the spirit of LED in Ghana. Both sets of authors intimated that though these organisations used different approaches, they however had the search for endogenous development based on local actors, resources and capacities as their prime focus.

Studies have also explored the nexus between value chain, local economic development and their impact on poverty reduction. Agbevade (2018d) for instance established that value chain and LED did impact poverty reduction depending on the stage of the value chain that one found self.

Lack of finance, inadequate agricultural assistance, poor road network, market accessibility, inadequate technical and incompetent human resource, ineffective coordination among the District Assemblies (DAs) and development partners, improper targeting of beneficiaries and lack of capacity to monitor and evaluate the impact of the programmes, top-down approach to implementation, poor formulation of national LED policy

that was incapable of providing strategic direction for LED promotion, poor land tenure system, excessive politicization, policy inconsistency, poor knowledge of modern trends and equipment were identified as bottlenecks to effective LED implementation in Ghana (Agbevade, 2018b; Mensah et.al. 2013b; Akudugu, 2013).

What Is Known about Political Settlement

The term political settlement is of fairly recent origin. One of the first traceable uses is in Melling's (1991) study of industrial capitalism and the welfare state, in 1995 and 2010, Mushtaq Khan used it in a development studies context to analyze the performance of institutions; it was later used by Fritz and Rocha (2007), and Kelsall (2016) also in the context of development studies. Political settlement like other social science concepts does not have a universally accepted definition. Different scholars and institutions have defined it in various ways to suit their purpose. A review of these definitions shows an increasing convergence around the idea that political settlement is about understanding the formal and informal processes, agreements, and practices that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power (Laws and Leftwich, 2014: 1), and that these will play out across two levels, involving both intra-elite and elite-non-elite relations (Laws, 2012).

Political settlement is often loosely used to describe the 'social order' based on political compromises between powerful groups in society that sets the context for institutional and other policies. It is a combination of power and institutions that are mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability. The term also refers to the informal power arrangements or social order of a country (Parks and Cole, 2010; Di Joh and Putzel, 2009). The key elements of a political settlement are actors, interests and institutions, typically a coalition of powerful elite factions that make up the key actors in a political settlement. According to Parks and Cole (2010), the process of development is primarily shaped by powerful political, economic and other social elites who exercise their influence proactively to shape and control formal governance institutions, policies and the distribution of development assistance to advance their interests.

The political settlements in developing countries are 'clientelist'. They are characterized by the significant exercise of power based on informal organizations, typically patron-client organizations of different types. Some patron-client networks can operate through formal organizations like political parties. In addition, developing countries are characterized by small size formal institutions hence absence of equal distributions of benefits to satisfy powerful groups hence the resort to informality (Khan, 2010). The likelihood of a group achieving the distribution it wants depends on its ability to hold out in conflicts. Engaging and holding out in conflicts is costly. This gives us the concept of holding power, defined as the capability of an individual or group to engage and survive in conflicts. Ability to impose cost and absorb cost have been identified as the factors that contribute to a group holding power.

In the political settlements framework a distinction is commonly made between the ruling elite — the top political leaders in an incumbent regime —and the ruling coalition—the factions that broadly support this ruling elite (Kjær, 2015). Differences in the distribution of power are conceptualized by Khan (2010: 64) both horizontally (the relative strength of elite factions outside the ruling coalition) and vertically (the relative strength of factions at lower levels within the ruling coalition). To this, Whitfield et al. (2015: 98) have added a focus on the degree of cohesion within the ruling elite.

Khan (2010) and Kelsall (2016) have come up with different typologies of political settlement. These are discussed below.

First is Khan's typology. He identified four-way typology of political settlements involving two varieties in which formal institutions are well aligned with existing power relations: capitalist political settlements (which broadly include most developed economies) and pre-capitalist political settlements (encompassing various forms of feudalism). Then there are two varieties of political settlement in which formal institutions are poorly

aligned with significant elements in the distribution of power: 'clientelist' political settlements (in which formal capitalist productive rights exist but are not well enforced, and powerful groups can influence outcomes regardless of formal rights) and 'political settlements in crisis'. The latter refers to situations where formal institutions have virtually collapsed and the settlement is being violently contested, while the former encapsulates a wide range of developing countries not in large-scale conflict. The category of clientelist political settlements is thus extremely broad, and can be broken down further by exploring how particular institutional configurations are supported by a context-specific balance of power.

Kelsall (2016) identified six types of political settlements, namely: inclusive, coordinated, impersonal settlements, exclusive, spoils-driven personalized settlements, hybrid settlements as the main types of political settlement. Kelsall advised that political settlements tools can still provide a reference point for development partners, however, insofar as they are able to influence events, policy advisors will want to try and encourage the emergence of a new settlement that not only is inclusive of the most powerful actors but also is based on mechanisms for elite coordination, rather than a simple sharing of spoils.

A handful of empirical studies have been done using the concept of political settlement. First, Goodfellow (2017:20) applied the political settlements approach to interpret developments in the built environment in Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia and found that the governing regimes in all three countries were clientelist, and relied to a significant extent on systems of patronage and the inconsistent application of laws and rules. There were disparities in how institutions were used to maintain political settlement. Kampala represented a sort of modal competitive clientelism, Kigali exhibited a structured, formalistic clientelism, in which official rules must be visibly respected (and where necessary sometimes changed). In Addis Ababa, state control of key resources provided additional formal instruments of clientelism distinct from those in the other two cases.

Using the Effective State and Inclusive Development political settlement framework, the Effective State for Inclusive Development (ESID) (2016) found that Ghana has experienced sustained growth without structural transformation. The agriculture sector has declined and the manufacturing sector has stagnated. There has been growth in the services sector, but it is characterized by low productivity and low wages, Ghana's export products have changed, but are still dominated by primary products, political patronage and personalization remain rife in the political settlement. Public institutions are weak and there are widespread perceptions of corruption. Weak public sector capacity hampered the production of quality public goods and management of the macro economy to facilitate growth. Although most firms in Ghana are small and medium-sized enterprises in the manufacturing sector, mining firms have closed relationships with the political elite, and very powerful. The relationship between the state and business remains closed to new firms, especially those in the manufacturing sector.

Oduro et. al. (2014) in their contribution to political settlement averred that in the short- to medium-term Ghana's democratic politics and development will continue to be informed and shaped by a competitive clientelist electoral politics. In the medium- to long-term, however, with the increasingly competitive nature of elections and the continuous expansion of the public space, the character of the political settlement will create the incentive structure for the ruling coalition to adopt sustainable policies and strategies towards inclusive development.

From the above reviews, it is clear that there exists a literature gap in the application of political settlement in explaining the behaviour of actors in the implementation of LED in Ghana's local governance system. This paper conceptualizes political settlement as the social order or informal arrangements that characterizes the behaviour of actors in the LED implementation process.

2. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The paper used is a blend of primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data was through the administration of elite interview and focus group discussions. Journal articles, chapters in books and official government reports constituted the bulk of materials used as secondary sources of data.

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

The paper established d the premise that the Operational Manual of LED in Ghana (Republic of Ghana, 2014:7-10) set the basis for political settlement in LED implementation. This is born e from the fact that the manual enumerated a number of stakeholders with different roles as actors in the LED implementation process. This implies that there is diffusion of power among the various actors because they all have various reasons and interests for their involvement. Below is a discussion of the dynamics that shaped the behaviour of actors in the LED process.

First, the nature of the LED programme. LED programmes are generally divided into two, namely software LED and hardware LED. The former refers to programmes such as capacity development, access to finance among others whilst the later includes the provision of infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools etc. MMDAs, which are the linchpins in LED implementation, are predominantly concerned with the later, therefore they give the needed support to a LED programme s that involve the provision of these things and tend not to support programmes oriented towards software LED. The behaviour of the MMDAs according to Akudugu and Laube (2013:15) is because most MMDAs were poor and located in remote communities and lacked the hardware facilities hence any initiative to bring the facilities to them received d the needed support from the local elites. In addition, LED strategies such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) culminated d into social and economic setbacks for residence. For instance, LED PPPs such as road and market construction required people to relocate. As such, residence mostly resisted and sabotaged d the process because of economic and social cost of relocating to new territories.

Second, the nature of the MMDA. The MMDAs are in different categories. For instance, LED programmes in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) which is a strategic MMDA because it is the national, regional and district capital of Ghana, Accra and the AMA respectively attracted the attention of even the central government because it saw it as an opportunity to woo electorates for political and electoral fortunes. For example, in the year 2016, which was an election year in Ghana, the government of Ghana through the AMA initiated ten PPPs without recourse to due process. The AMA also considered itself as a superior assembly to even state institutions such as the Public Investment Division of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the National Fire Service and the Environmental Protection Agency hence did not seek approval before inviting transaction advisors to undertake feasibility studies, did not receive fire and environmental safety approvals. Unlike in Bongo District and other deprived MMDAs, where state institutions such as the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) have reduced the MMDAs to instruction takers.

Third, the activism of the actors. Empirical evidence abounds that in MMDAs where all the LED actors were active, there was total inclusion and the reverse was true. For instance in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA), it was revealed that the actors (residence, SODA, Kpone Irrigation Scheme, etc) were actively involved in the LED process hence none of the actors was regarded as an “underdog” in the process. This resulted in the interests of all the actors represented in the LED strategies implemented in the district. The opposite was the case in the Keta Municipal, the Accra Metropolitan and Bongo District Assemblies where some of the actors were reduced to instruction takers. For instance in the AMA, the citizens for instance were not involved in the LED process of PPPs for building markets and the choice of land. However, there was resistant to building the markets at the designated places because the lands earmarked for the projects were not legally acquired from the owners. In the case of the Keta Municipal Assembly, due to the inactivity of the Business Advisory Center (BAC) to project LED at the General Assembly, LED budgets never made it to the Assembly for discussion and approval.

Fourth, the benefits that the actors stand to gain. Wolman and Spitzley (1996) have intimated that actors get involved in LED because of the advantages that will inure to them. Residence of MMDAs involve themselves in LED programmes because of the belief that it will create employment, generate income and ultimately reduce the level of poverty. Entrepreneurs and owners of capital look at the return on their investments and politicians and local government leaders are interested in bolstering their political and electoral chances. These interests were seriously at play across the MMDAs in Ghana. For instance, the SODA and KeMA, though had good LED initiatives, they could not attract the needed investments due to the long period that the investments will take before they mature meanwhile entrepreneurs/investors needed immediate returns. Investors were not interested in MMDAs like Bongo District because of the level of poverty though it boosts of a LED programme in shea butter. On the other hand, wealthy and economically vibrant MMDAs such as the AMA and Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) were attracting investment for their LED programmes. In addition, financial institutions, which the operational manual identified as one of the actors, were interested in the interest from their investments. As a result, when they cannot get high interest on their investments like the entrepreneurs, they also withdrew from LED. This was the case in the SODA and KeMA where residence who benefitted from access to finance as a LED strategy were reluctant to repay the loan facilities given to them.

Fifth, the political party in power also influenced the behaviour of the actors. For instance, when National Democratic Congress was in power, the leadership of the Public Investment Division of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was helpless in ensuring that the PPP process flowchart was duly adhered to. They gave provisional approval to the AMA to kick-start the implementation process of the PPP projects. This was because the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Public Investment Division (PID) of the Ministry was a government appointee by virtue of Article 195(1) of the 1992 Republican Constitution, which vested appointment of public office holders in the hands of the President (Republic of Ghana, 1992). However, a change in political leadership in power in 2017 saw the PID righting the wrong. This implies that the CEO's behaviour in the LED process under both governments was purely motivated by gaining favour from the appointing authorities. The back and forth in the operations of the PID following political power transition eventually brought about cessation in the PPP projects. This is contrary to the constitutional provision in Article 35(7), which stipulates, "As far as practicable, a government shall continue and exercise projects and programmes commenced by the previous Governments" (Republic of Ghana, 1992:36).

Sixth, the need to experiment new development paradigms. LED as an alternative approach to development emanated from the global North. This reason motivated the behaviour of donor agencies (UNDP, GIZ, ILO, UN-HABITAT etc) in particular. As indicated by Akudugu and Laube (2013:15) that "donor agencies continue to experiment, in order to find new development prescriptions that will allow them to stay within their market-liberal and democratic normative frameworks...".

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The paper distilled that enough legal and institutional provisions have been made for the implementation of LED in Ghana with adequate actors both local, public, private and international. However, these actors had diverse interest in most of the MMDAs in Ghana hence "turf war" in LED implementation in those MMDAs. These factors culminated into each actor resorting to the projection and protection interest, which is a major characteristic of political settlement. In addition, the actors with sufficient resources dominated the LED process thereby reducing the less endowed actors or beneficiaries of LED interventions to instruction takers. Leadership, the economic location and immediate returns on investments were three key factors that played pivotal roles in the attraction of investments in LED to MMDAs in Ghana.

From the above the following recommendations are made:

1. Actors' involvement in LED must be based on the supreme interest of the MMDA and not on the sole parochial economic and investment interests of the actors especially the financing actors,
2. Non-interference or drastic reduction in the interference of the work of public servants so they apply rules and regulations in the interest of national development,
3. Reduction in the powers of the President especially when it comes to appointment of higher officials in the public service. This will allow the officials free hand to operate without fear or favour. Permanent tenure must be guaranteed to these public officials,
4. Leadership of MMDAs should be proactive and aggressive in marketing the resource endowment of their various localities to woo investors to the areas, and
5. Incentives such as tax holidays, reduction in tariffs etc should be granted to investors who invest in less endowed MMDAs for LED purposes.

Three forceful lessons have been learnt:

6. The existence of actors is not sufficient for the successful implementation of LED, rather, the actors must be willing to cooperate with each other in the process,
7. Leadership played a huge roles in the LED implementation of MMDAs,
8. The strategic nature and location of MMDAs greatly influenced the dynamics of LED implementation in MMDAs in Ghana.

5. REFERENCES

1. Agbevade, A. (2018a). "Financing Local Economic Development in Ghana: A Comparative Analysis of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai-Osudoku District Assemblies". *ADRRJ Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, Ghana*, 16 (1.4), 52-73.
2. Agbevade, A. (2018b). "Local Economic Development Strategies and Challenges: A Comparative Empirical Evidence from Ghana's Local Governance System", *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 8(4), 110-126.
3. Agbevade, A. (2018d). "Value chain and local economic development in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly of Ghana: The experience of the Asutuare rice farming project", *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research*, 10(2), 7-19.
4. Akudugu, A.J. (2013). *Organising and implementing Local Economic Development initiatives at the District level in Ghana*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Rheinischen Friedrich – Wilhems Universität.
5. Akudugu, J.A. & Laube, W. (2013). "Implementing local economic development in Ghana: Multiple actors and rationalities", 113, *ZEF Working Paper Series*, pp. 1-19.
6. Asante E.A. (2012). "The Case of Ghana's President's Special Initiative on Oil Palm (PSI-Oil Palm)", *DIIS Working Paper 2012:11*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
7. Di John, J. & Putzel, J. (2009). 'Political Settlements: Issues Paper', Birmingham: GSDRC.
8. ESID, (2016). "Ghana's political settlement and constraints to structural transformation", *ESID Briefing No. 14*, 1-4. March, 2016.
9. Ghana, Republic of, (1992). *The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992*, Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation.
10. Ghana, Republic of, (2014). *Operational Manual on LED for District Assemblies in Ghana*, Accra: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.
11. Ghana, Republic of, (2016). *Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936)*, Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, Accra.
12. Ghana, Republic of, & United Nations Development Programme, (2011). "Local Economic Development", *2011 Annual Working Paper*, Accra.
13. Fritz, V. & Rocha M.A. (2007). 'Understanding State-building from a Political Economy Perspective'. London: Overseas Development Institute.
14. Goodfellow, T. (2017). "Seeing Political Settlements through the City: A Framework for Comparative Analysis of Urban Transformation", *Development and Change*, 00(0), 1-24.

15. Kelsall, T. (2016). "Thinking and working with political settlement", Shaping Policy for Development, Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper, 1-8.
16. Khan, M. (1995). 'State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutional Economics', in J. Harris (Ed.), The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. London: Routledge.
17. Khan, M. (2010) 'Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-enhancing Institutions'. Draft Research Paper on Growth-enhancing Governance. London: School of Oriental and African Studies.
18. Kjær, A.M. (2015). "Political Settlements and Productive Sector Policies: Understanding Sector Differences in Uganda", World Development, 68, 230–241.
20. Laws, E. (2012). "Political Settlements, Elite Pacts and Governments of National Unity". De-velopment Leadership Programme Back-ground Paper 10.
21. Laws, E. & Leftwich, A. (2014). 'Political Settlements'. Concept Brief 1. Birmingham: DLP
22. Melling, J. (1991). "Industrial Capitalism and the Welfare of the State: The Role of Employers in the Comparative Development of the Welfare State. A Review of Recent Research". Sociology, 91(2), 219-239.
23. Mensah, J.K., Bawole, J. N., & Ahenkwa A. (2013a) "Local Economic Development Initiatives in Ghana: The Challenges and the Way Forward", Journal of Public Administration and Governance, 3(2), 142-160.
24. Mensah, J.K., Domfeh, A.K., Ahenkwa A., & Bawole, J. N. (2013b) "Policy and Institutional perspectives on Local Economic Development in Africa: The Ghanaian perspective", Journal of African Studies Development, 5(7), 163-170.
25. Mensah, J.K., Bawole, J.N. and Ahenkan, A. (2017). "Local Economic Development in Ghana: From the "lost decades" to a policy "maturing" stage", Development Southern Africa, 34(5), 607-621.
26. Oduro-Ofori, E. (2016) "Decentralization and Local Economic Development Promotion at the District Level in Ghana" in Dick, E. Gaesing, K., Inkoom, D. & Kausel, T. (Eds.), Decentralization and Regional Development: Experiences and Lessons from Four Continents over three decades, accessed at www.springer.com, retrieved on 5th November, 2016.
27. Oduro, F., Awal, M. & Ashon, M.A. (2014). "A dynamic mapping of the political settlement in Ghana", ESID, Working Paper No. 28, Oxford: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre.
28. Ofei-Aboagye, E. O. (2009) "Economic Decentralisation and Local Development: Concepts and Issues", Journal of Local Government Studies, 1 (1), 1-28.
29. Parks, T. & Cole, W. (2010) 'Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice'. Occasional Paper 2. Manila: The Asia Foundation.

INFO:-

Corresponding Author: *AKPEKO AGBEVADE, University of Cape Coast, College of Distance Education & Entrepreneurship Training Institute. Mobile Number: +233(0)243340551, Email: aagbevade@gmail.com*

How to cite this article: *AGBEVADE AKPEKO, The Political Settlement of Local Economic Development in Ghana's Local Governance System, Asian. Jour. Social. Scie. Mgmt. Tech. 2(4): 165-173, 2020.*